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The Discard Problem – a Comparative Analysis of Two Fisheries: the English Nephrops Fishery 
and the Dutch beam trawl Fishery 
 
Tom Catchpole, Olvin van Keeken, Tim Gray and Gerjan Piet 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Discarding is the throwing overboard of unwanted fish or benthic animals
1
 that have been caught by 
sea fishing vessels.  Some estimates suggest that as much as 25% of the global amount of fish caught is 
discarded annually.  In this comparative analysis of discarding in two contrasting North Sea fisheries – 
the English Nephrops fishery and the Dutch beam trawl fishery – we seek to identify their reasons for 
discarding, and to discuss the effectiveness of measures that might reduce their rates of discarding, 
relating causes/solutions to management measures, market forces and fisher’s behaviour. Our findings 
are that despite the many differences between the two fisheries and their respective discard problems, 
one common thread – the importance of incentives - runs through both of them.  Absence of incentives 
is the main cause of the discard problem, and presence of incentives is the main solution to that 
problem. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Getting rid of unwanted fish by throwing them overboard is a widespread practice in commercial sea 
fisheries across the world.  Annual estimates of the amount of fish discarded globally have varied 
during the last 20 years between 6.7 and 39.5 million tonnes (Pascoe 1997: 11; Alverson et al 1996; 
Kelleher 2004: Abstract).  In some fisheries, the discard rate is high: for instance, in the North Sea 
Nephrops norvegicus trawl fisheries, up to 83% of the total catch in numbers is discarded, while in the 
North Sea flatfish beam trawl fisheries, discard rates of plaice (Pleuronectes platessa) reach 80% in 
numbers (ICES 2005).  Discarding has been frequently criticised for wasting a valuable source of 
protein-rich food, at a time when many fish stocks are declining.  The economic cost of discards, in 
terms of both the immediate and long-term loss of edible fish, has been calculated at “billions of 
dollars” (Alverson et al 1996: Chapter 3).  Discards may even threaten the economic survival of fish 
species in some fisheries (Pascoe 1997: 18; Cappell 2001: section 10).  Although there have been 
innumerable analyses of the causes of discarding, and many research projects designed to find ways of 
reducing the levels of discards, the discard problem remains a serious issue facing fisheries managers.  
In this study, we focus on two cases – the English Nephrops fishery and the Dutch beam trawl fishery 
targeting sole (Solea solea) and plaice – with a view to determining whether each fishery is unique in 
its discard problems and solutions, or whether there is some common ground between them.  Our 
finding is that they do share one important characteristic – that the key to the causes of, and solutions 
to, their discard problems, lies in the absence or presence of appropriate incentives. 
 
 
2.  Methodology 
 
This is an interdisciplinary study, in that it is based on both fisheries science and social science data.  
We chose to compare the English Nephrops fishery to the Dutch beam trawl fishery targeting sole and 
plaice because they offer a sufficient mix of similar and dissimilar features to make the comparison 
meaningful.  Their similar features include the facts that they are both trawl fisheries in the North Sea 
and they both show high discard rates for target species (in case of the Dutch beam trawl fishery for 
plaice, but not for sole).  Their dissimilar features include the facts that the English fishery targets 
crustaceans, whereas the Dutch fishery targets flatfish; the English Nephrops fishery uses otter trawls, 
whereas the Dutch fishery uses beam trawls; the English Nephrops fishery is located in the northern 
part of the North Sea, whereas the Dutch beam trawl fishery is mainly located in the southern part of 
the North Sea; the English Nephrops fishery operates in an area (the Farne Deep) which is not subject 
to restricted access, whereas the Dutch beam trawl fleet is not allowed to fish within the Plaice Box 
with vessels larger than 300 HP (Pastoors et al. 2000); and the English Nephrops fishery’s discards are 
principally whiting (Merlangius merlangus), which is a species whose spawning area is widespread 
                                                          
1
 In this study, we define discards in terms of discarded edible fish, crustaceans and benthic organisms.  
We exclude, therefore, discards of plant material, offal, sea mammals and sea birds. 
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throughout the northern North Sea, whereas the spawning area of plaice, a principal discarded species 
of the Dutch beam trawl fishery, lies in the southern part of its distribution area. The data that we use 
for the English Nephrops case were obtained by Catchpole during the course of his PhD research 
(2000-05) into the English Nephrops fishery, entailing natural and social scientific analysis of the 
trawling activity of seven otter trawlers, together with semi-structured questionnaires administered to, 
and in-depth interviews conducted with, 25 skippers (80% of the total number of North Shields 
Nephrops fishery skippers).  The data that we use for the Dutch beam trawl fishery were obtained from 
the Dutch discard sampling program for 2001-2002: in 2001, four fishing trips were sampled on Dutch 
beam trawlers operating with 80 mm mesh size, while in 2002 six fishing trips were sampled.  Social 
scientific data were obtained informally from conversations with fishers and at other opportunities  
 
 
3.  Case study I: the English Nephrops fishery  
 
The English Nephrops fishery operates in the North Sea, off the north east coast of England adjacent to 
the Farne Deep.  The main port is North Shields, where landings have an annual value of about £4 
million.  The fishery is seasonal, from September to April, and the mode of fishing is mostly single-rig 
otter trawling.  Regulations stipulate a minimum mesh size of 80 mm; a large mesh diamond panel 
inserted near the headline; a square mesh panel at the front of the extension; and cod end twine 
thickness restrictions.  There are minimum landing sizes (MLSs) for most commercial species; catch 
composition requirements 
2
; and an annual quota for Nephrops of 4170 tonnes.  There are also days-at-
sea restrictions of 22 days per month. 
 
The amount of discarding in the English Nephrops fishery during the 2001/02 season (September 2001-
April 2002) was estimated at 3684 tonnes, which represents a discard rate of 43% 
3
. Most of the 
discards were whiting 
4
 (2661 tonnes), which constituted 72% of the discards by weight, and 16% of 
the total whiting discards in 2001-02 in the whole of the North Sea, where whiting is currently outside 
safe biological limits.  The estimated potential economic value of the whiting, haddock and cod 
discarded in the fishery in 2001/02 is £1.8 million (Catchpole 2005c).   
 
3.1  Causes of discarding 
In assessing the causes of this discarding, let us divide the analysis into management measures, market 
forces and fisher’s behaviour.  Management measures include quota and catch composition restrictions, 
and MLS regulations. However, there is no evidence that the extent of whiting discards is affected by 
either quota or catch composition restrictions.  This may be because the chances of inspection are very 
low, and even when inspected, the chances of prosecution for an offence are very slim 
5
.  Fishers state 
that quota limits are the least frequent reason for discarding either Nephrops or fish.  
 
MLS regulations do not have much influence on the discard or landing patterns of either Nephrops or 
whiting, since large numbers of Nephrops under the MLS are landed, while a quarter of the whiting 
discards are above the MLS.  MLS does however have a marked influence on the discards of cod 
(Gadus morhua) and haddock (Melanogrammus aeglefinus), in that few of either of them above the 
MLS are discarded.  Compliance with MLS is, therefore, a significant cause of cod and haddock 
discarding. 
 
Turning, secondly, to the action of market forces, this is one of the major determinants of discarding 
levels of Nephrops and whiting in the North Sea Nephrops fishery (Catchpole et al 2005b: 53).  The 
presence of demand for small Nephrops means that Nephrops discards are low; whereas the lack of 
demand for whiting means that 25% of the discarded whiting is above the MLS, and if the price for 
whiting is too low, none at all may be landed. 
  
                                                          
2
 The minimum percentage of legal-sized Nephrops is 30%; and the maximum percentage of by-catch 
of legal-sized protected fish species is 60%.  
3
 In an earlier study, the discard rate was estimated at 59% (Evans et al 1994) 
4
 32% of the whiting on the fishery grounds that encountered a trawl were caught, and 86% of the 
whiting caught were discarded (Catchpole et al 2005b: 45). 
5
 In England, the chances of being inspected on land are only 6%, while the chances of being inspected 
at sea are less than 1% (NAO 2003).  Of the 109 offences detected by the North Sea District Sea 
Fisheries Inspectorate in 2000, only four cases resulted in prosecution (NEDSFC 2000).  
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Thirdly, fishers’ behaviour is a crucial factor in influencing discard rates (EP 1999: section 5.3), in 
particular, their choice of gear selectivity.  Fisheries scientists claim that the selectivity of the gear 
chosen by fishers is the main cause of discarding.  Even when regulations require the adoption of more 
selective techniques, fishers have proved “adept at circumventing” these regulations (EP 1999: section 
7.2; cf Pascoe 1997: 89).  English Nephrops fishers do not consider that lowering discards will have an 
obvious conservation benefit, whereas scientists believe that lowering discard levels is essential for 
stock improvement.   
 
3.2  Strategies to reduce discarding 
Let us now consider strategies for reducing discards in the English Nephrops fishery.  Firstly, 
management measures include relaxing quota and/or MLS restrictions to allow the landing of smaller, 
marketable, fish.  But there is little evidence that either more quota or lower MLS would reduce the 
large discards of whiting, while the discard levels of cod and haddock are too low to warrant such 
steps.  Another management measure is to restrict fishing time (effort control), which is an easier 
regulation to enforce than are quota controls.  But there is no evidence that the current permitted days-
at-sea regulations in the English Nephrops fishery – 22 days per month - have reduced effort or 
discarding, because weather and tidal conditions do not allow for more days fishing than the 22 days 
permitted.  A further reduction in days-at-sea would cut total discards, but at a substantial cost to 
fishers’ earnings.  In a fishery that simultaneously targets a healthy stock (Nephrops) and stocks in poor 
condition (whiting and cod), reducing fishing effort is not an economically efficient way of cutting 
discards.  On the other hand, regulators could allocate more fishing days to fishers using more selective 
gear.  So, although fishing time restrictions do not in themselves offer a practicable means of reducing 
discards in the English Nephrops fishery, they can be used discriminately to encourage fishers to adopt 
selective fishing techniques (Catchpole et al 2005a). 
 
This leads us to another management strategy for reducing discards – regulations on gear selectivity.  
This is the strategy that is most approved by fishers, and it has been applied to the English Nephrops 
fishery.  Since 1992, the UK has introduced legislation for an increase in codend mesh size, two sizes 
of square mesh panel (SMP), and a diamond mesh panel in Nephrops trawls. In 2000, the EU made 
square mesh panels mandatory for all EU-managed North Sea demersal fisheries.  However, although 
the whiting discard rate fell by 11% following the application of these technical measures, the amount 
of whiting discards still remained high (at 393 kg per vessel per day in 2001-2 compared with 434 kg 
per vessel per day in 1991 (Evans et al 1994).  This suggests that high levels of discarding continued 
,despite the application of new gear regulations and the compliance of fishers.   
 
A discard ban is another possible management measure to reduce discards.  Such a ban could pressure 
skippers into fishing more selectively than at present, but a discard ban in the English Nephrops fishery 
would result initially in large quantities of mostly undersized whiting being landed.  This leads us to 
the question of how market forces can be adjusted to dispose of such unwanted produce: fishers would 
need an economic incentive to comply with such a ban.  
 
Closed areas or spatial management is another measure that could be taken to reduce discards.  
However, in the case of the English Nephrops fishery, spatial management is not a feasible policy, 
because the area fished is relatively small – 58 km by 75 km – and there is no evidence that discard 
patterns are significantly spatially dependent.  Closure of parts of this area would not, therefore, be 
effective in this fishery – the fleet would simply discard similar quantities in the places left open for 
fishing.   
 
Secondly, market forces have already contributed the most significant solution to one of the discard 
problems in the English Nephrops fishery – the discarding of small Nephrops.  The development of a 
new market for small-sized Nephrops during the late 1980s reduced the Nephrops discard rate from 
85%
6
 to 7%
7
 (Catchpole et al 2005a: 427).  If a similar market could be developed for small whiting, 
the high level of whiting discards could also be reduced.  Changing consumer tastes is a long-term 
strategy; in the short term, undersized whiting could be used for fishmeal and fish oil (based on current 
fishmeal prices of £86 per tonne, the estimated potential annual value of these fish discards is 
                                                          
6
 Estimates of rates of discarded Nephrops by number varied between 85% and 57% (Catchpole et al 
2005b: 46). 
7
 During the 2001/02 season, this rate was cut to 5%, which is 93% lower than in 1991 (Catchpole et al 
2005b: 45; 52). 
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£215,000).  Much could also be done (and is being done by Seafish Industry Authority in liaison with 
fishers) to market fish products with a labelling scheme to show that they have been caught with a low 
discard component.  
 
Turning, thirdly, to fishers’ behaviour, there are two relevant issues here.  The first issue is fishers’ 
willingness to adopt more selective gear.  In addition to compulsory selective gear such as square mesh 
panels, there is a range of discard-reduction techniques that could be voluntarily adopted by fishers in 
the English Nephrops fishery.  An example supporting this claim is the experience of one skipper, who, 
in order to reduce discards, altered his trawl by lowering the headline height, using a large mesh size in 
the wings, and increasing the area of square mesh panels.  Considerable research has been devoted to 
developing separator trawls or grids, with a success rate of up to 90% in separating whiting from 
Nephrops (Arkley 1988).  The Netrasel project developed a two-grid separator system which not only 
separated fish from Nephrops, but also released undersized Nephrops.  Seafish’s Fisheries 
Development Centre in Hull has recently announced the result of a five year project to reduce discards 
in the English Nephrops fishery, with a coverless trawl designed to avoid the capture of unwanted by-
catch in the first place.  Seafish claim that the coverless trawl reduces the by-catch of whiting and 
haddock by over 60%, without affecting the catch of Nephrops (Fishing News 22/4/05: 8).  Evidently, 
then, selective gear does exist which can reduce whiting and haddock by-catch in the Nephrops fishery 
(though, of course, not all by-catch is discarded).   
 
The crucial question is, therefore, not technical but behavioural – how to persuade fishers to instal the 
selective gear.  One way to do so might be to educate them more effectively about the adverse impacts 
of discards on the marine environment, and the consequential long-term damage to commercial species 
of fish.  Significantly, however, only one North Shields skipper mentioned the conservation benefits of 
discard reduction, which suggests an ecological deficit in fishers’ understanding of marine science.  
However, it is questionable whether fishers would be greatly influenced by environmental education 
about the long-term health of the marine ecosystem: they are more likely to respond to short-term 
economic incentives, such as access to otherwise closed areas.  This path has been chosen in the Irish 
Nephrops fishery, where an ‘inclined’ separator trawl, which is designed primarily to reduce cod 
capture, but also separates whiting and haddock, while allowing Nephrops to be retained, has been 
made compulsory for fishing in temporarily closed areas in the Irish Sea (Rihan and McDonnell 2003).   
 
However, to make this gear effective, fishers need not only to comply with the regulations by installing 
the gear, but also to become pro-active in tuning the gear to maximise its effectiveness.  Innovatory 
gear often works well during sea trials, but is less efficient under commercial conditions.  Moreover, 
even the most effective gear is not perfect, and some marketable fish will inevitably escape from more 
selective trawls.  For instance, the Netrasel system resulted in a loss of up to 20% of the Nephrops 
catch (Radcliffe 2001).  This is the main reason why fishers are reluctant to adopt more selective gear – 
they are not willing to risk a drop in their target catch 
8
.  Accordingly, regulators must find incentives 
that are sufficiently attractive to outweigh this risk.  Privileged access to closed areas is one such 
incentive: another is direct subsidy, but the UK government is not willing to subsidise fishers.    
 
This brings us to the second issue relating to fishers’ behaviour – their participation in regulatory 
decision-making.  An alternative, or additional, incentive to providing direct economic incentives as a 
means of persuading fishers to adopt more selective gear is to grant them opportunities (political 
incentives) to participate in the decision-making processes whereby such gear is introduced.  
According to critics of the present hierarchical or ‘top-down’ system of fisheries governance, it has not 
generated a culture of respect for the regulations, and there is consequently widespread non-compliance 
(Crean and Symes 1994).  Moreover, the bureaucracy of the EU’s system has meant that decisions to 
introduce more selective gear have sometimes been delayed for years: for instance, 20 years elapsed 
from the initial recognition of the value of square mesh panels, to the EU’s regulation making them 
compulsory.  A more participative system of fisheries governance would, it is argued, lead to greater 
compliance and speedier decision-making, by removing the sense of alienation from decision-making 
processes which 77% of North Shields fishers currently feel 
9
, and by conferring a greater sense of 
                                                          
8
 It is encouraging to note, however, that 55% of North Shields skippers believed that discarding could 
be reduced without a significant loss of Nephrops (Catchpole et al 2005b).   
9
 One North Shields skipper wrote in a questionnaire return that “The fishery could improve 
substantially with proper management”; another said that “the stocks should not decline if managed 
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legitimacy on decisions 
10
.  Also, participation would widen the information base on which such 
decisions rely (Gray 2006).  For instance, collaborative gear technology research between fishers and 
scientists has been shown to benefit from fisher’s extensive knowledge of the marine environment, and 
to help instil in the fishers a greater sense of confidence in the scientific analysis of the long-term 
benefits to fish stocks of discard reduction strategies (Melvin 2003).  Even being routinely consulted as 
stakeholders would enable fishers to be better informed about the harmful ecological and economic 
impact of discarding.    
 
However, in the English Nephrops fishery, there is little overt appetite among most fishers for greater 
participation in fisheries governance: only 27% of North Shields skippers want to be more involved in 
decision-making 
11
.  There are three reasons for this reluctance.  First, the fishers feel little sense of 
responsibility for marine resources.  Unlike other inshore fisheries, where there is often a sense of 
communal ownership of the resource and an incentive to protect the fishery, the English Nephrops 
fishery, which has a transient fleet of which 70% is made up of visiting vessels, is characterised more 
by mutual competition for the target stocks, than a collective sense of proprietary stewardship over this 
resource.  Second, the fishers do not trust each other in decision-making roles.  Skippers ranked other 
fishers as being poor at protecting fishery resources. This perception was borne out by their behaviour 
in relation to a voluntary agreement made in 1989 by the North Shields Prawn Fishermen’s Association 
to ban twin-rig trawls on the Nephrops fishing grounds, because they were too efficient at hoovering up 
the stocks: that agreement was subsequently breached by several skippers (NEDFO 1997).  Third, the 
fishers have different institutional affiliations: the 25 questioned skippers working from North Shields 
were members of six different producer organisations and three different national fishermen’s 
associations.  This means that there is no single industry group ready to assume the role of representing 
the fishers in a future participative form of fisheries governance.  Moreover, only 45% of fishers 
considered themselves well-represented by their respective organisations.    
 
However, advocates of participation would argue that the North Shields fishers’ lack of enthusiasm for 
participation should not deter us from pursuing it on their behalf.  For one thing, fishers themselves 
recognise the need for better policies to deal with the discarding problem – 59% of skippers consider 
that too much fish is discarded, and 46% believe that there are advantages to themselves of discard 
reduction (for instance, reduced sorting time would improve vessel efficiency).  For another thing, 
fishers may come to acknowledge that if they participate, then they are more likely to obtain the kind of 
discard reduction measures that they prefer and can live with.  If they fail to take responsibility for 
getting involved in the decision-making process, then they may be at the mercy of environmental 
agencies and pressure groups that increasingly find favour with the governing authorities.  Of course, 
there is no guarantee that fisher’s participation will achieve what they want.  But the alternative is a 
continuation of top-down regulative measures, with even more stringent restrictions on fishing 
opportunities and resultant costs to the fishing industry.   
 
In summary, our first conclusion on the English Nephrops fishery is that there is a persistently high 
level of discarding in the English Nephrops fishery that contributes to the weakening of a stock (North 
Sea whiting) that is currently outside safe biological limits.  Our second conclusion is that the main 
obstacle to discard reduction is lack of incentive rather than lack of technical ability.  Historically, there 
has been an emphasis on developing technical solutions, but now we need to accompany technical 
research with measures designed to increase the incentives of fishers to utilise the technical tools that 
are available.  Our third conclusion is that an understanding of fishers’ behaviour is crucial to a 
solution to the discard problem, in order to find the best ways to incentivise fishers to introduce more 
selective gear.  This entails consultation with the industry, formulating fishery-specific discard targets, 
emphasising the long-term economic costs of not discarding, and creating immediate economic 
incentives for not catching unwanted fish.  Our fourth conclusion is that we must explore ways of 
increasing the political will of regulators to introduce adequate incentives to employ selective gear 
technology.  If fishers were more involved in fisheries decision-making, they could help to stiffen that 
political will.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
properly”; and a third remarked that “conserving stocks is good.  But conserving fishermen is often 
overlooked” (Catchpole 2003).  
10
 A North Shields skipper wrote in a questionnaire return that “Unless rules and regulations have 
fishermen’s support and are seen to work by fishermen, it’s futile” (Catchpole 2003).  
11
 One of these skippers declared that we should “be running our fisheries ourselves” (Catchpole 2003). 
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4.  Case study II: the Dutch sole/plaice fishery  
 
The Dutch beam trawl fleet is the largest sector in the Netherlands fishing industry, with 374 vessels 
taking 252 million euros in 2003, 65% of the total fisheries revenue (Taal et al 2004).  In 2003, the 
fleet comprised 173 inshore vessels with engine power between 261-300 hp, which are allowed to fish 
in the Plaice Box, and 147 offshore vessels with engine power above 300 hp, which are excluded from 
the Plaice Box and 12-miles zone. Most of the beam trawlers target sole and plaice in the southern 
North Sea, using a mesh size of 80 mm, while a small part of the fleet targets only plaice in the more 
northern areas using 100 mm mesh size.  Landings of the two fish species have fallen during the last 
ten years: sole from 33,000 tonnes in 1994 to 19,000 tonnes in 2004; and plaice from 110,000 to 
61,000 tonnes (ICES 2005).  The fishery is regulated through individual transferable quotas (ITQs) for 
sole, plaice, cod and whiting.  Usually the total allowable catches (TACs) are taken for both sole and 
plaice (ICES 2005). The market value of sole is on average four to five times higher than that of plaice.   
 
For this case study, discards estimates were obtained from four fishing trips in 2001, and six trips in 
2002, on commercial beam trawlers targeting sole and plaice with 80 mm mesh size.  No trips were 
made on vessels targeting plaice with 100 mm mesh size, so the discard data below do not include this 
segment of the fleet.  From these ten observed discard trips, the total amount of discarded material was 
estimated at 6,850 kg per vessel per day, while the total landings were estimated at 2,100 kg per vessel 
per day.  So the overall discard rate (including all fish and benthic material) was 77% of the catch.    
The discards were dominated by plaice (1,400 kg) and dab (Limanda limanda) (1,300 kg), while the 
weight of the sole discards was 48 kg per day. Survival of plaice and sole discards was estimated at less 
than 10%, because most of them are severely damaged by the trawl (Van Beek et al 1990).  Cappell 
(2001; para 8.1.3) estimates that the economic value of the marketable species discarded in the Dutch 
beam trawl fishery is about 160 million euros per year, 70% of the value of the landed catch.   
 
4.1  Causes of discarding 
In assessing the causes of discarding in the Dutch beam trawl fishery, we again divide our analysis into 
management measures, market forces, and fishers’ behaviour.  Relevant management measures include 
gear selectivity and quota.  Gear selectivity is the main cause of fish discards.  Their smaller body 
width and greater flexibility enables sole to escape through the mesh at larger lengths than plaice.  The 
50% retention length of plaice when using commercial beam trawls is about 17.5 cm, while the 
minimum landing size is 27 cm (Rijnsdorp et al 1981; Van Beek et al 1981; 1983).  As a result, many 
undersized plaice, as well as dab, are caught and discarded. Turning to quota, in some years, 
marketable fish have been discarded due to low quota (Buisman et al 2001). Cappell (2001: para 8.1.3) 
argues that high-grading is “directly connected with the individual quota system”. This is partly 
because of the mixed character of the Dutch beam trawl fishery, when, for example, the quota for 
plaice is almost fished up, but the quota for sole can still be taken.  Moreover, fishers may high-grade 
to save quota for other periods in the year, when fish are more valuable.  
 
Market forces have been responsible for some discarding of large plaice during the spawning season 
when quality is poor and prices are low (Buisman et al 2001), but high-grading can also occur when 
many individuals of a strong year class recruit to the fishery in a month, driving down prices because of 
the sudden large supply of these fish.  During the discard observation trips, however, high grading was 
not observed.  
 
Fishers’ behaviour has contributed to the discard problem in that fishers have not responded adequately 
to the changes in growth and spatial distribution of juvenile plaice that have occurred during the last 
three decades.  The average mean length of plaice in the 1990s/2000s is less than during the 
1970s/1980s (Rijnsdorp et al 2004), and lower growth rates entail a longer period of time during which 
plaice are exposed to discarding.  As a result, the distribution of notably the younger age-groups of 
plaice has shifted further offshore (Van Keeken et al 2006).  
 
4.2  Strategies to reduce discarding 
Turning to the three strategies that can be taken to reduce discards in the Dutch beam trawl fishery, we 
begin with management measures. Improving gear selectivity is an important management strategy, 
which has been a major preoccupation of the Dutch beam trawl fishery, resulting in considerable 
research efforts (Fonds and Blom 1995; Van Marlen 2000). One solution is to increase mesh size from 
80 mm, allowing the juvenile plaice to escape through the mesh.  Van Beek et al (1981) suggested that 
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the most appropriate mesh size for a fishery targeting plaice should be not less than 120 mm, which 
would result in hardly any loss of marketable plaice. However, this would mean a considerable loss of 
marketable sole. Some fishers complain that the 80 mm mesh size already loses them marketable sole, 
and they use liners (nets with smaller meshes that are illegally inserted inside legitimate nets) to offset 
this loss (Buisman et al 2001; Cappell 2001: para 8.1.15).  Other alterations to the gear could also 
reduce discards. Large mesh panels in the top of the net are used to allow roundfish (mainly gadoids) to 
escape, without significant loss of flatfish (Van Marlen 2003).  This does not, however, address the 
problem of plaice discards.  Reduction in the number of tickler chains reduces the catch of benthic 
animals, but at the cost of reducing sole catches.  Other gear alterations like separator panels, square 
mesh panels and escape tunnels have also been investigated, but found to be ineffective in reducing 
juvenile plaice discards (Van Marlen 2000; Buisman et al 2001).  
  
With regard to effort control, under the MAGP IV initiative, restrictions on tonnage, engine power and 
days-at-sea have been imposed.  For example, on average, beam trawlers had 174 days-at-sea in 2001, 
but only 165 in 2002 (Taal et al 2004).  Reduced engine power leads to a reduction in discards, but it 
also reduces the target catch, with a consequent fall in revenue.  Reducing days-at-sea restricts the 
opportunities for high-grading, because it limits the time available for fishers to look for areas with 
higher quality fish.  On the other hand, since steaming time is included in the days-at-sea, the incentive 
for fishers to steam to places far from the coastal area is reduced, and this may result in increased effort 
in grounds closer to shore, where there is a higher chance of catching juvenile plaice.  Also, fishers 
claim that they need the present number of days to catch their quota (Cappell 2001: para 8.1.5).   
 
With regard to quotas, Cappell (2001: para 8.1.5) argues that a reduction in the sole quota would 
reduce the incentive for fishers to use liners, and might even encourage them to use larger mesh sizes, 
which would cut juvenile discards.  Also, in an attempt to reduce high-grading, the individual quota 
system could be changed by introducing multi-annual total allowable catches (TACs), which would 
give fishers more flexibility in distributing their landings over a longer period of time (Cappell 2001: 
para 8.1.5).  Another management strategy to reduce discards is to reduce the MLSs, but a large 
reduction in MLS is viewed very negatively by fishers, because it would deflate market prices for 
target fish (Cappell 2001: para 8.1.5), and result in increased high-grading, if the quotas remained 
unchanged. A discard ban would result in large numbers of juvenile plaice and dab being landed, some 
of which could have survived being discarded 
12
.  It would also be unpopular with fishers, if the 
undersized fish came off their quotas. 
 
Closed areas have played perhaps the greatest part in the Dutch management strategy to reduce discard 
levels, and the Plaice Box is the most important example of this policy.  Discard observations during 
1976-1990 revealed very high discard levels of juvenile plaice in the shallow coastal waters in the 
southern North Sea encompassing the major plaice nursery grounds.  In 1989, the Plaice Box was 
established to protect juvenile plaice by excluding beam trawlers with larger than 300 hp from this area 
during the second and third quarters of the year.  In 1994, this exclusion was extended to the fourth 
quarter, and since 1995, the area has been permanently closed to these vessels.  After closure, the total 
effort in the Plaice Box decreased to about 6% of that before closure (Pastoors et al 2000).  However, 
in contrast to expectations, the recruitment, yield and spawning stock biomass of plaice has decreased 
since the introduction of the Plaice Box (ICES 1999; 2004).  Several hypotheses have been put forward 
to explain this failure of expectations.  First, the high density of juvenile plaice and decreased food 
supply has reduced its growth rate (Rijnsdorp 1999). Second, small vessels are still allowed to fish in 
the Plaice Box (EP 1999) 
13
.  Third, the distribution pattern of plaice has changed, though the reason 
for this change is unclear (Pastoors et al 2000; Grift et al 2004; Rijnsdorp et al 2004; Van Keeken et al 
2006). Juvenile plaice that were protected from the large beam trawl fishery by the Plaice Box have 
been moving out of this area at smaller lengths (Van Keeken et al 2004) and, as a result, discard 
observations during 1999-2003 showed high discard rates outside the Plaice Box (Van Keeken et al 
2004), which before the closure were only observed inside the Plaice box (Van Beek 1998).  
Nevertheless, the Plaice Box still protects approximately 70% of the juvenile plaice (Grift et al 2004).  
 
                                                          
12
 Dutch fishers are traditionally more optimistic than are Dutch scientists about the survival prospects 
of discarded flatfish. 
13
 The under-300 hp beam trawlers (eurocutters) which are allowed into the Plaice Box have a higher 
discard rate (57%) than have the over-300 hp beam trawlers (45%) (Cappell 2001: para 8.1.3).   
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Temporary closed areas (e.g. during the spawning season) are potentially useful in protecting plaice.  
Adult plaice lose weight and energy during spawning, and have lower market value as a result.  
Because these fish are vulnerable to being high-graded, temporary closures of spawning areas protect 
them from being caught and discarded.  But the problem with temporary closed areas is that when they 
are re-opened, fishing effort may increase greatly, leading to a higher level of discards than before the 
closures, thereby reducing their gains.  For instance, during the early 1990s, the Plaice Box was only 
closed for the second and third quarters, and when it re-opened during the fourth quarter, effort 
increased substantially (ICES 1994).  Moreover, most fishers are opposed to temporary closed areas, 
because they fear that such closures will become permanent, like the Plaice Box (Cappell 2001: para 
8.1.5).   
 
With regard to market forces as a means of reducing discards in the Dutch beam trawl fishery, if MLS 
were reduced or a discard ban imposed, the problem of how to dispose of the undiscarded catch could 
be addressed by trying to persuade the consumer to buy juvenile fish.  It is encouraging to note that in 
the last decade, markets for non-quota fish such as dab, flounder (Platichthys flesus), Norway pout 
(Trisopterus esmarkii) and grey gurnard (Chelidonichthys gurnardus) have been developed, and prices 
have been increasing for these species. As a result, the incentive to discard them is low, and fishers 
claim that most marketable non-quota fish is landed, even when prices are not high (Buisman et al 
2001).  However, marketing of juvenile plaice would do little to reduce their mortality. 
 
Finally, with regard to fishers’ behaviour, moves could be made to demonstrate more effectively to 
fishers the effects of their fishing practices, including reminding them that they are retaining only 2 in 
every 10 plaice they catch from an impoverished stock, the remainder being thrown back dead or 
dying.  Damaging fishers’ behaviour that could be ended is the practice of using liners inside 80 mm 
mesh nets to prevent the escape of a small number of sole above the MLS of 24 cm.  Also, shorter haul 
duration and lower towing speed could be demonstrated to increase the chances of survival of some 
discarded species.  Such proposals are currently unpopular with fishers because they would disrupt 
crew sleeping patterns, and reduce the target catch, but perhaps changes in fisher’s behaviour could be 
brought about through greater participation by Dutch fishers in fisheries governance.  Although the 
Dutch fisheries management system is formally one of co-management – i.e. where national 
representatives of fishers meet with government officials to formulate fisheries policy - in practice, the 
system works in a hierarchical, top-down fashion (Van Ginkel 2006: 136).  However, Dutch fishers are 
more pro-active than are North Shields fishers, and making a reality of co-management could improve 
fishers’ willingness to take part in formulating and implementing discard policies. 
 
In summary, our first conclusion on the Dutch beam trawl fishery is that most technical solutions to the 
problem of high levels of juvenile plaice discards entail significant reductions in the target catch of 
sole, which fishers find unacceptable.  Our second conclusion is that one spatial measure (the Plaice 
Box), has failed to reduce these high levels of plaice discards. Our third conclusion is that market 
forces, while they can help utilise catches of unwanted species, cannot solve the problem of reducing 
mortalities of juvenile plaice.  Our fourth conclusion is that the incentivising of fishers to address the 
problem of juvenile plaice discards requires a greater sense of responsibility by fishers to engage in 
fisheries governance. 
 
 
5.  Comparative analysis of the two case studies 
 
In this section we compare the causes of, and solutions to, the discard problem in the two fisheries, 
employing again the three categories: management measures, market forces and fishers’ behaviour.  
Management measures are divided into quota, effort restrictions, technical measures and closed areas.  
On quota, there is a contrast between the English Nephrops fishery, where quotas are the least frequent 
reason cited by fishers for discarding either the target species (Nephrops) or the largest bycatch species 
(whiting), and the Dutch beam trawl fishery, where quotas do seem to influence discard levels of 
marketable fish, especially at the end of the year. This contrast may reflect the fact that quota 
regulations are more poorly enforced in the English Nephrops fishery than in the Dutch beam trawl 
fishery.  More flexible quota arrangements could help to incentivise fishers to reduce discards and/or 
blackfish landings in each fishery. 
 
Days-at-sea restrictions below 22 days per month will reduce discards in the English Nephrops fishery, 
but at the expense of a substantial loss of fishers’ earnings. Above this level it will not have any impact 
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as weather and tidal conditions do not allow for more than 22 days fishing per month.  In the Dutch 
beam trawl fishery, days-at-sea restrictions in combination with the current high oil prices encourage 
vessels to stay closer to shore to economise on steaming time, and this puts more pressure on juvenile 
plaice. However, in both fisheries, regulators could allocate more fishing days to fishers using selective 
gear than to those fishers not using selective gear, to incentivise all fishers to adopt selective gear. 
 
Minimum landing size (MLS) is not a significant cause of discarding of either Nephrops or whiting in 
the English Nephrops fishery, but does cause discarding of cod and haddock. In the Dutch beam trawl 
fishery, the MLS for plaice contributes to the discarding of juveniles. Lowering the respective MLSs 
would reduce discards in each fishery, but at the potential cost of depressing fish prices generally, 
which is a disincentive for fishers.  The same reasoning applies even more to a discard ban, which 
would drastically reduce fishers’ revenues if complied with.  Moreover, neither measure would lower 
the mortality rate of juvenile fish, only the discarding rate.   
 
While skippers in the English Nephrops fishery acknowledge that poor gear selectivity is the main 
cause of discards, and have readily accepted square mesh panels introduced in 1992, the increase in 
minimum mesh size in 2002 only marginally reduced whiting discards (70% of the whiting catch is still 
discarded).  With their existing technology, North Shields fishers could significantly reduce their 
whiting discard levels with only a small loss of landings 
14
, but most skippers seem to be unwilling to 
bear any loss to achieve discard reduction. Similarly, mesh size enlargement is seen as problematic in 
the Dutch beam trawl fishery, because it would sharply reduce the catch of marketable sole, even 
though it would reduce discarding of juvenile plaice.  Again a lack of incentive is the key problem, 
though until selective gear is invented that will effectively separate young plaice from mature sole, it is 
difficult to see how to incentivise skippers in this fishery.    
 
A closed area (or ‘spatial management’) policy is the final management measure to be considered in 
this comparative analysis. In the English Nephrops fishery, there is no evidence that closed areas would 
reduce discards, because the area fished is relatively small, and it does not have spawning sub-areas.  In 
contrast, in the Dutch beam trawl fishery a closed area policy has been at the heart of its anti-discard 
policy, in the shape of the Plaice Box.  However, the effect of the Plaice Box was less then anticipated 
during its installation. This could be partly due to the fact that juvenile plaice have shown an offshore 
shift in their spatial distribution in recent years, thereby moving to areas outside the Plaice Box where 
they are more vulnerable to fishing activity (Van Keeken et al 2006).  
 
With regard to market forces, the development of a market for small Nephrops in the English Nephrops 
fishery during the last 20 years has resulted in a 93% fall in discard rates, although the lack of a market 
for whiting has meant that 25% of legally-sized whiting is discarded. In the Dutch beam trawl fishery, 
markets for non-quota fish have grown, so that most non-quota fish is now landed.  However, 
developing a market for juvenile plaice is unlikely to result in a reduced catch of them. 
 
Finally, with regard to fisher’s behaviour, the message that comes from both fisheries is that at least 
some of the features of fishers’ behaviour in relation to the discard problem could be addressed by 
greater engagement of fishers in discard reduction decision-making.  In other words, in addition to 
economic incentives to persuade fishers to adopt selective gears, such as privileged access to closed 
areas or larger quotas or direct subsidies, fishers might be offered political incentives, such as 
participation in making decisions about the kind of discard reduction measures that should be taken. 
English fishers are less disposed towards participative governance than are Dutch fishers, but if they 
could be convinced that their engagement would improve the situation, they might be persuaded to take 
part. 
 
 
6.  Discussion 
 
In the above similarities and contrasts, one theme runs through them all – the critical importance of 
incentives. According to most observers, the main incentive for any fisher in the main European 
fisheries (including the English Nephrops and the Dutch beam trawl fishery) is to maintain or increase 
short-term economic profits. On this view, any action that will reduce short-term economic profits is to 
                                                          
14
 This was demonstrated by a skipper who voluntarily made changes to his gear, thereby reducing 
discards by up to 30% (Catchpole et al 2005b).   
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be avoided, even if such action might increase economic profitability in the longer term.  Applying this 
perspective to the English Nephrops fishery, we find that there is sufficient technical ability to reduce 
whiting discards at a relatively small economic cost, because it only marginally reduces Nephrops 
landings.  But the positive incentive to reduce discarding in this fishery is more ecological, as it has  
only a limited market for whiting.  Whiting is an important target species in some other North Sea 
fisheries, so the benefit of a reduction in whiting discards in the English Nephrops fishery would be 
seen mostly in these other fisheries. 
 
By contrast, in the Dutch beam trawl fishery, technical measures such as larger mesh-sizes come at a 
substantial economic cost, because they considerably reduce landings of its most valuable species, sole. 
The positive incentive to reduce discarding is both ecological and long-term economic, because one of 
the main discard species, plaice, is also a major target of the fishery, albeit less valuable than sole. Thus 
what the two fisheries have in common is their lack of incentives to reduce discards because this will 
reduce their short-term economic profits. The difference between the two case study fisheries is one of 
measure: for the Nephrops fishery, the small reduction in short-term economic profits outweighs the 
ecological incentive to reduce discarding; whereas for the beam trawl fishery, the big reduction in 
short-term economic profits outweighs even the potentially large long-term economic and ecological 
benefits. 
 
From our experiences of these two fisheries, how can we ensure that the long-term economic and 
ecological incentives compete more effectively with the short-term economic incentives?  We are not 
confident that blunt enforcement of measures designed to prevent discarding, such as effort control,  a 
discard ban or increased mesh size will work, because they would either be circumvented by 
disgruntled fishers or drive the fishers out of business.  We are more optimistic about economic forces 
playing a constructive role in altering the balance between long-term and short-term incentives, but 
only if externalities or side-effects are brought into the equation.  
 
Economic incentives have been successful in reducing discards where the technical ability to achieve 
discarding has been relatively high.  Area closures and fishing time restrictions, although not effective 
(or appropriate) by themselves to reduce discards, have provided the necessary incentive for fishermen 
to adopt more selective fishing methods.  For example, selective grid systems have been introduced in 
the Norwegian whitefish fishery (Isaksen 2000) and the Kattegat and Skagerrak Nephrops fishery 
(Valentinsson and Ulmestrand 2005) following restrictions on fishing opportunities. When using these 
designs, fishermen are rewarded with more fishing opportunities.  Similarly, access to an otherwise 
closed area in the Irish Sea is granted to those fishermen willing to use a selective Nephrops trawl 
design (Rihan and McDonnell 2003). 
 
The manipulation of market forces may also be a useful tool in generating the necessary economic 
incentive to reduce discards.  For example, if the economic cost of environmentally harmful fishing 
practices were factored into the price of the fish, this would result in a decrease of demand, which 
could result in less pressure on the stock, and fewer discards of a resource which is severely under 
pressure.  One way of doing this would be to impose a penalty on discarding, which could take the 
form of a tax per unit of effort per fishery.  The difference between the two case study fisheries would 
be that for the Nephrops fishery this tax could be substantially lower than for the beam trawl fishery, 
because a relatively low tax in the Nephrops fishery will probably provide enough incentive to 
implement the measures necessary to reduce discards.  The relatively high tax per unit of effort 
necessary for the beam trawl fishery corresponds to the relatively high external costs of discarding in 
this fishery. An additional advantage of this measure is that it would encourage fishers to develop and 
use more selective gear as well as reduce the pressure on the stock through market forces, because it 
would increase the price of the target stock.  Whether such a proposal would be favourably received by 
fishers is, however, another matter.  
 
Alternatively, managers could help to create a market for the discards.  Such a measure would be more 
likely to succeed in the Dutch beam trawl fishery than in the English Nephrops fishery, because 
undersized plaice are more marketable than undersized whiting. If there were no concomitant increase 
in the TAC, this would effectively reduce the fishers’ income as the discards are less valuable. 
Conversely, if there were an increase in the TAC, the incentive of short-term gain could result in high-
grading, thereby diluting the beneficial effects of this measure.  An important consideration in market 
development, therefore, is to determine whether the management objective behind discard reduction is 
to cut down waste or to improve stock condition.  Creating a market for fish that is currently discarded 
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could cut down waste but harm stock condition, because of an increase in the fishing effort exerted on 
juvenile fish. 
 
The success of such measures critically depends upon how they are received by fishers.  One way of 
helping to create a positive reception in the minds of fishers is to nourish the notion of fishers as 
committed to the long-term future of the marine environment.  All stakeholders agree that discarding is 
a wasteful practice and should be avoided as much as possible, the fisher possibly just as much as any 
environmentalist.  The problem outlined above - that it is not possible to prevent discarding and run an 
economically profitable fishing operation with the current functioning of market forces – depends upon 
the assumption that the main incentive for fishers in the EU is short-term economic profit.  But this 
assumption does not entail that this is the fishers’ only incentive.  For many fishers, their long-term 
economic viability is at least as important as their short-term economic profit-maximisation.  
Moreover, for at least some fishers, the ecological health of the marine environment is also an 
important consideration – not least because they recognise that the environmental movement is steadily 
gaining ground in the corridors of decision-making in fisheries governance, and they cannot count on 
an indefinite period of immunity from the legal requirement that their activities must be evaluated for 
their environmental impact.  In other words, other stakeholders may begin to hold fishers accountable 
for their actions, thereby incentivising fishers to consider seriously how to reduce their discard levels.  
Indeed, in the future, fishers may have to contemplate taking on a role of environmental stewardship as 
the condition imposed by society on their right to fish.  
 
 
8.  Conclusion 
 
In this article, we have investigated the discard problem in two different types of North Sea fishery, 
with the aim of improving our understanding of what are the causes of high levels of discarding, and 
what solutions may be available.  We have found that, while one of the most significant differences 
between the two fisheries is technological – in that the technology for reducing bycatch discarding 
without serious loss of the target catch already exists in the English Nephrops fishery, but does not 
exist in the Dutch beam trawl fishery – the solution to their discard problems in both cases depends 
ultimately on the incentives that fishers have for reducing discard levels.  We argue that while the 
primary motive of fishers is short-term profit maximisation, they have two secondary motives – long-
term economic viability and ecological sustainability - which can be built upon by adjusting market 
forces and by recognising the necessity for fishers to develop into environmental stewards.   
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